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Abstract
Causal models are key to flexible and efficient exploitation
of the environment. However, learning causal structure is
hard, with massive spaces of possible models, hard-to-compute
marginals and the need to integrate diverse evidence over many
instances. We report on two experiments in which participants
learnt about probabilistic causal systems involving three and
four variables from sequences of interventions. Participants
were broadly successful, albeit exhibiting sequential depen-
dence and floundering under high background noise. We cap-
ture their behavior with a simple model, based on the “Neu-
rath’s ship” metaphor for scientific progress, that neither main-
tains a probability distribution, nor computes exact likelihoods.
“We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct
their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom.
Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put
there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support.”
(Quine, 1969, p3)
Introduction
It is tremendously hard to learn causal models. Even in ap-
parently simple circumstances, it is necessary to cope with
a huge diversity of complex, noisy and probabilistic interac-
tions, and thus to integrate, often painfully, over extended ex-
perience. Optimal reasoning with distributional causal beliefs
places substantial demands on inference and storage. Nev-
ertheless, in several studies (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speeken-
brink, 2014; Coenen, Rehder, & Gureckis, 2014; Lagnado
& Sloman, 2004, 2006; Steyvers, 2003) it has been shown
that people can learn successfully from interventional data
in probabilistic scenarios. Existing experiments have largely
been confined to small structures, small data and semi-
determinism, thus limiting the computational demands and
the need for heuristics or approximations. Here, we report on
two experiments designed to tax learning more severely, with
a broad range of structures, long sequences of data points,
and substantial noise (Experiment 1) whose level and nature
participants have to infer as they learn (Experiment 2). We
thereby examine how people deviate from rational norms, and
explore what this can tell us about their psychological pro-
cesses.
Representing causal structure
We adopt a ubiquitous framework for formalizing models
of causal structure – the parametrized directed acyclic graph
(Pearl, 2000). Arrows represent causal connections; and pa-
rameters encode the influence of parents (the source of an
arrow) on children (the arrow’s target). Such graphs can
represent continuous variables and any forms of causal rela-
tionship; here we focus on binary {0,1} variables and gen-
erative connections. We adopt Cheng’s power PC (1997)
parametrization for which the probability that a variable takes
the value 1 is a noisy-OR combination of the power or
strength S of any active causes in the model, together with
an omnipresent background cause B that is exogenous to the
model. S and B are assumed to be the same for all connec-
tions and components, and there is no other latent variable
(although see Buchanan, Tenenbaum, & Sobel, 2010).
Optimal structure learning
The likelihood of a datum (a complete observation, or the
outcome of an intervention) d given a noisy-or parametrized
causal model m over variables X , with strength and back-
ground parameters S and B is
P(d|m,S,B) =∏x∈X P(dx|dpa(x),S,B) (1)
P(dx = 1|dpa(x),S,B) = 1− (1−B)(1−S)∑y∈pa(x) dy (2)
where pa(x) denotes the parents of variable x in the causal
model. We can thus compute the posterior probability of
model m ∈M over a set of modelsM given a prior P(M) and
observations D. We can condition on S and B if known:
P(m|D,S,B) = P(D|m,S,B)P(m|S,B)
∑m′∈M P(D|m′,S,B)P(m′|S,B)
(3)
or else marginalize over their possible values
P(m|D) =
∫
S,BP(D|m,S,B)p(S,B)P(m) dS dB
∑m′∈M
∫
S,BP(D|m′,S,B)p(S,B)P(m′) dS dB
(4)
If data arrive sequentially, we can either integrate them at
the end, or update our beliefs sequentially, taking the current
posterior as the new prior P(M) for the next datum1.
Scope for approximation
Learning is hard because the number of possible graphs
grows rapidly with the number of components (3, 4 and 5-
variable problems have 25, 543, 29281 respectively) and there
is no known closed form update for densities over S and B in
noisy-OR models. To understand how people might mitigate
this computational explosion, we take inspiration from ma-
chine learning.
Approximating with a few hypotheses One common ap-
proximation is based on a manageable number of individual
hypotheses, or particles (Liu & Chen, 1998), with weights
1For the present, we ignore the related question of active learning
– i.e., the efficient selection of interventions. See the discussion.
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corresponding to their relative likelihoods. Sophisticated
reweighting and resampling schemes allow particle filters im-
pressive fidelity.
In rodent learning (Courville & Daw, 2007), and human
categorisation (Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010) and bi-
nary decision making (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenen-
baum, 2009), it has been proposed that people’s beliefs ac-
tually behave more like a single particle, capturing why indi-
viduals often exhibit fluctuating and sub-optimal judgements,
whereas group-level posteriors are smooth.
Local search A related simplification is to edit these parti-
cle hypotheses only locally – for instance adding, subtracting
and reversing individual connections to one’s current causal
structure in searching for changes that make the model more
likely (Cooper & Herskovits, 1992). This is approximate
since the complex dependencies between the connections im-
ply that one cannot guarantee to be able to learn each one
separately (although see Fernbach & Sloman, 2009).
Prior assumptions People might also exploit simplifying
priors, for instance, expecting causal connections to be strong
(high Strength) and sparse (low Background noise) (Lu,
Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng, & Holyoak, 2008), and structures
to be “well designed” (Bramley, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado,
2014), lacking redundant connections, or unconnected com-
ponents. These would be sensible, since causal models sim-
plify inference only to the extent that their structure reduces
the number of relata per variable. Mayrhofer and Wald-
mann (2011) suggest that people might favor determinis-
tic causal structures, accommodating noisy data by assum-
ing that causal connections are occasionally “broken”. Their
study assumed an absence of background noise; but one could
imagine an equivalent accommodation treating inexplicable
events as being ‘miraculous’. This suggests the heuristic
proxy for likelihood judgments for a model as a simple count
of the number of variables lacking explanation.
A class of simple structural change models
The resulting picture of a heuristic causal learner is remi-
niscent of Neurath and Quine’s (1969) metaphor for theory
change in science. Here, the theorist is cast as relying on
their theory to stay afloat, without the privilege of a dry-
dock to make major improvements. At most local changes
to patch leaks and to improve the theory are possible, without
the whole space of possibilities ever being considered.
Similarly, we propose that causal learners might: (1) main-
tain only a single causal model (a single particle) bt−1 at time
t − 1; (2) search for local improvements (adding, subtract-
ing, reorienting edges) in order to (3) (approximately) max-
imize the number of aspects of the new data dt for which
their model can account (Figure 1). Iterating this proce-
dure leads to reasonable, though sub-optimal, causal structure
judgments without either representing more than one causal
model or remembering old evidence.
We parametrized a whole class of such models via two con-
structs: the dissimilarity between bt−1 and a potential new bt ,
and the suitability of that bt for capturing dt . We quantified
dissimilarity in two ways. One is simple difference E∗btbt−1 ,
which is 1 iff bt is non-identical to bt−1 and 0 otherwise. The
second is the Edit distance Ebtbt−1 , which counts the num-
ber of edits (additions, subtractions, reversals of links) going
from bt−1 to bt (ranging from 0 to 6 for a 4 variable problem).
We quantified the suitabilities via two approximate likeli-
hoods. One, Lbt (dt), is the correct noisy-OR likelihood un-
der a prospective new belief bt . The second, explanatory
inAdequacy Abt (dt), just counts the number of component
states that the prospective model fails to explain.
We considered the eight viable combinations of these
constructs (singletons labeled E,E∗,L,A; pairs labeled
E∗L,E∗A,EL,EA). Each model can be taken to generate a
likelihood for a subject’s choices based on a softmax proba-
bility that the model assigns to a choice of bt . For instance,
for EA, this probability is
P(bt) =
exp(Ebtbt−1θ1+Abt (dt)θ2)
∑exp(Ebtbt−1θ1+Abt (dt)θ2)
(5)
with parameters θ1 and θ2 that can be fit to maximize the
likelihood. For the moment, we assume that subjects search
over all possible edits; how they actually perform this search
is an important question for the future.
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Figure 1: A simple structure change model. The learner encounters
data that are not well explained by their model so they search for a
local change that improves it. By balancing the edit-cost E against
reduced inability to explain the latest outcome A, they opt to add a
connection a→ b.
Experimental rationale
To explore these approximations, we considered sequential
structure learning in appropriately difficult problems. If sub-
jects really maintain only a single causal belief and make lo-
cal edits, we expect sequential dependence, and a tendency to
get stuck in local optima. If they forget old evidence, relying
on the current structure itself, we expect to observe recency
effects whereby participants may return to judgments previ-
ously rejected. Finally, if they rely on generic priors we ex-
pect to see better performance when the true causal structure
is conformant.
We therefore designed two online studies based on the
paradigm used in Bramley, Lagnado and Speekenbrink
(2014) (demo at ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/ns15a). Participants
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interacted with a series of probabilistic causal systems involv-
ing 3-4 variables, repeatedly selecting interventions (or tests)
to perform in which any number of the variables were either
fixed on or off, while the remainder were left free to vary.
The tests people chose, along with the true underlying causal
model, S and B, jointly determined the data they saw. We sys-
tematically varied the number of connections between com-
ponents in the problem set, along with S and B.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we restricted ourselves to the effects of “ex-
pected” uncertainty (Yu & Dayan, 2003) by training subjects
explicitly on the true prevailing values of B and S.
Methods
Participants We recruited 150 participants (85 male,
mean±SD age 35±10 from MTurk, split randomly between
9 conditions (group size 16.7± 3.4). They were paid $1.50
and received a bonus of 10c per correctly identified con-
nection on a randomly chosen test for each problem (max=
$6.00, mean±SD $3.68± .75). The task took an average of
41±20 minutes.
Design We included five 3-variable and five 4-variable
problems (see Figure 2). Within these, we varied the sparse-
ness of the causal connections, ranging between a single con-
nection (devices 1; 6) to fully connected structures (5; 10).
We included problems exemplifying three key types of causal
structure: forks (diverging connections), chains (sequential
connections) and colliders (converging connections).
There were three different levels of causal strength S ∈
[1, .85, .6] and three different levels of background noise B ∈
[0, .15, .4] making 3×3= 9 between-subjects conditions. For
instance, in condition 1 (S= 1;B= 0) the causal systems were
perfectly deterministic, with nothing activating without being
intervened on, or caused by, an active parent, and connections
never failing to cause their effects. Meanwhile, in condition 9,
(S= 0.6;B= 0.4) the outcomes were very noisy, with proba-
bility .4 that a variable with no active parents would activate,
compared to a probability 1− (1− .6)(1− .4) = 0.76 for a
variable with one active parent.
Procedure The causal systems were represented as grey
circles on a white background. Participants were told that the
circles were components of a causal system of binary vari-
ables, but were not given any further cover story. Initially, all
components were inactive and no connection was marked be-
tween them. Participants performed tests by clicking on the
components, setting them at one of three states “fixed on”,
“fixed off” and “free-to-vary”, then clicking “test” and ob-
serving what happened to the “free to vary” components as a
result. The observations were of temporary activity (graph-
ically activated components would turn green and wobble).
After each test, participants registered their best guess about
the underlying structure. They did this by clicking between
the components to select either no connection, or a clockwise
or anti-clockwise connection, (represented as black arrows).
Participants were incentivized to report their best guess about
the structure, through receipt of a 10¢ bonus for each causal
relation (or non-relation) correctly registered at randomly se-
lected time points throughout the task.
Participants completed instructions familiarizing them
with the task interface; the interpretation of arrows as (prob-
abilistic) causal connections; the incentives for judgment ac-
curacy; and the level of S and B in their condition. To train
participants on S and B, they were shown first 10 unconnected
components and forced to test them 5 times. The frequency
with which the components activated reflected the true back-
ground noise level. Then, they were shown a set of two-
component causal systems where component “A” was a cause
of “B”, and were forced to test these systems 5 times by fix-
ing component “A” on. This indicated that the frequency with
which “B” activated reflected the level of S combined with
the background noise they had already learned (e.g. 76% of
the time in condition 9).
After completing the instructions and correctly answering
comprehension checks, participants solved a practice prob-
lem drawn from the five three-variable problems. They then
faced the 10 test problems in random order, with randomly
orientated unlabeled components. They were given six tests
per three variable problem and eight tests per four variable
problem. After the final test for each problem they received
feedback telling them the true connections.
Results
Performance by condition We expected the quality of par-
ticipants’ judgments to be bracketed by those of a random ( 13
per link, given the three possibilities) and a Bayes-optimal
observer. For the latter, we calculated the posterior distribu-
tions over the task using Bayesian integration based on the
outcomes the participants actually observed, calculating the
likelihoods using the true causal strength S and background
noise B, assuming a uniform prior at the start of each problem.
By reporting the MAP structure (guessing in the event of ties)
participants could have achieved accuracies ranging between
.84±0.14 in condition 2 and .55±0.09) in the nosiest condi-
tion, 9 (see Figure 3, blue circles). Optimal learning predicts
differences by condition, with a considerable reduction in ac-
curacy going from no to high background noise, and a more
moderate reduction going from perfectly strong to highly un-
reliable causal connections.
Participants significantly outperformed chance in all nine
conditions (all p values < .05 for t-tests comparing to 13 ).
However they underperformed the Bayes-optimal observer
(t-test p values < .05) in all conditions bar condition 2 S =
0.85,B = 0 (p=0.07). Like the optimal observer, participants
became less accurate as noise increased, with a main effect
of Background noise F(2,147) = 6.34,η2 = 0.07, p = 0.002
with lower performances for B = 0.1, t(147) = −2.23, p =
0.03 and B= 0.4, t(147) =−3.5p< .001 compared to B= 0,
but no main effect of Strength F(2,147) = 1.2, p= 0.3.
Participants marked more causal connections per problem
than the optimal learner, mean±SD estimates 2.93±1.4 com-
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pared to 2.75± 1.4, t(2998) = 3.5, p = 0.0005. The true
proportion was 2.6. The number of connections participants
marked on average was affected by both B and S, going from
2.78± 1.5 for B = 0 to 3.14± 1.4 for B = 0.4, and 2.77
(SD=1.4) for S= 0.6 to 3.01 (SD=1.4) for S= 1.
Performance by problem Average accuracy on three vari-
able problems was fractionally higher than on four vari-
able problems .55±0.34 compared to .52±0.29, t(1463) =
2.0, p = 0.04, and tests were completed marginally quicker
with medians 12.3s and 14.6s. Due to the unrestricted tim-
ing of the study, test times were highly positively skewed.
Therefore, we tested for a difference between medians by
permutation test (Higgins, 2004), finding it significant p <
.0001. However, there was no main effect of the number of
connections on judgement accuracy F(1,1498)− 2.1,η2 =
0.001, p= 0.14.
There was a significant main effect of device type
F(5,1444) = 2.91,η2 = 0.007, p = 0.02 (see Figure 2). Ac-
curacy was lowest for chains (devices 3; 8) 0.49± 0.28, and
highest for colliders 0.57± 0.30 (4; 9). Taking the chain
as treatment group, the main effect of device was driven by
higher accuracy on colliders (4; 9) t(1497) = 3.2; p= 0.001,
and marginally higher performance on singly- (1; 6) and
fully-connected (5; 10) structures.
Changing judgements Comparing participants’ sequences
of structure judgments indicates that they shift markedly less
frequently than the optimal observer, changing an average of
0.94± 1.3 connections after each test compared with 1.78±
1.5, χ2(6) = 1920, p< .0001 (see Figure 3b)
Discussion
Participants identified causal connections above chance even
in the most complex and noisy situations we tested. Nev-
ertheless, they were systematically less accurate than they
could have been. This is hardly surprising given the consid-
erable complexity of the inferences, and invites comparison
with the heuristics discussed earlier. That response times do
not increase greatly going from three- to four-variable prob-
lems argues against explicit Bayesian-like calculations, as
these grow at least O(2N) with increasing number of vari-
ables N. Nevertheless, that the ensemble behavior across all
participants resembles the (averaged) posteriors (Figure 2)
is in line with the idea that individuals’ judgments can be
plausibly thought of as individual particles. The strong se-
quential dependence in judgments argues firmly against their
representing the whole distribution. Finally, systematic over-
connecting, especially for high B, fits with subjects’ failing
to compute the exact likelihoods even when they know the
parameters, but rather relying on more generic or heuristic
approximations.
As a hint that the heuristic models discussed above might
therefore offer a better model of the subjects’ behavior, the
green dots in figure 3 show the case of EA with θ1 = θ2→ ∞
(so that the MAP structure is chosen at each iteration), and
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Figure 2: a) The problems faced by participants. b) Weighted
average final judgments by participants. Darker arrows indicate
that a larger proportion of participants marked this link in their fi-
nal model. c) Bayes-optimal marginal probability of each edge in
P(M|d1:T ,S,B), averaged over participants.
with ties broken randomly. This matches more closely the
subjects’ performances per condition, and also their patterns
of sequential judgment edits.
Modeling
To test the models more formally, we fit the likelihoods of
the various combinations, as in the example of equation 5, to
the judgments bt=1:T of all participants, for all problems. We
expect the resulting θ parameters to be such that lower dis-
similarities and fewer explanatory inadequacies lead to more
probable selection. Judgments at t = 0 were assumed to be
an unconnected causal model, but starting evaluation at t=1,
when a judgment was already in place, produces comparable
results.
We also considered two baseline models. One is
a a parameter-free model that assumes each judgment
is a random draw from all possible causal models
p(bt = m) = Unif (M) (leading to a probability 13 for
each link). The other model is a variant of the Bayes-optimal
model that allows decision noise to corrupt choices from the
true posterior at t, P(M|D,S,B)t . For this, we considered
P(bt |D) = exp(P(M|D,S,B)tθ1)∑m∈M exp(P(m|D,S,B)tθ1)
(6)
controlled again by an inverse temperature parameter θ1.
Separately, we estimated maximum likelihood S∗ and B∗
265
a) b)
0 1 2 3
Three component structures
Edit distance between consecutive judgements
P
ro
po
rti
on
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
● ●
●
●
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Four component structures
Edit distance between consecutive judgements
P
ro
po
rti
on
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
● ● ● ● ●
●
●
c)
Condition
Edit distance
S=1 S=.6 S=1 S=.6 S=1 S=.6
A
cc
ur
ac
y
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
B=0 B=.15 B=.4
Participant Final Accuracy Experiment 1
Condition
●
●
● ● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Final accuracy Exp 1
0 1 2 3
Three component structures
Edit distance between consecutive judgements
P
ro
po
rti
on
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
● ●
●
●
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Four component structures
Edit distance between consecutive judgements
P
ro
po
rti
on
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
● ● ● ● ●
●
●
0 1 2 3
Three component structures
Edit distance between consecutive judgements
P
ro
po
rti
on
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
● ●
●
●
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Four component structures
Edit distance between consecutive judgements
P
ro
po
rti
on
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
● ● ● ● ●
●
●
Edit distance
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Ac
cu
ra
cy
3-component problems 4-component problems
Best tting S and B
S=1 S=.6 S=1 S=.6 S=1 S=.6
A
cc
ur
ac
y
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
B=0 B=.15 B=.4
Participant Final Accuracy Experiment 1
Condition
●
●
● ● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Benchmark
Bayesian
Neurath's ship
Chance
B*
S*
0 0.15 0.4
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
1 0.85 0.6
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
Actual
0 0.15 0.4
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
1 0.85 0.6
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
Actual
Figure 3: a) Mean final accuracy with standard errors. White circle: benchmark (greedy expected information gain maximizing) Bayesian
learner. Blue circles: Bayesian learner that maximizes over the posterior after seeing participants’ interventions. Green triangles: “Neurath’s
ship” simulation simply minimizing number of edits E and failures to explain A. Red squares: random guessing. b) Bars show average
number of edits (additions, subtractions or reversals of connections) between all t and t+1 judgments, as compared to Bayesian, “Neurath’s
ship” and random choice simulations. c) Boxplot of best fitting S∗ and B∗ parameters assuming learners soft- aximised over P(M|D,S∗,B∗).
parameters for participants assuming Equati n 6.
Fitting the models Altogether we fit 9 different (fixed ef-
fects) models separately to each of the 150 participa ts. Mod-
els were fit using maximum likelihood as implemented by R’s
optim function, and compared using their BIC scores to ac-
commodate their different numbers of parameters. Results
are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1: Experiment 1 - Models fitted to individuals’ judgments by
maximum likelihood. McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is reported, alongside
BIC, median soft-maximization weighting parameter estimates θs.
N best fit according to BIC, and average final judgment accuracy for
those best fit.
Model BIC Rsq θ1 θ2 N fit Accuracy
Baseline 104535 0 0
P(M|D,S,B) 91629 0.13 8 0
L 97532 0.07 2.9 0
A 98152 0.07 -1 1 .33
E∗ 80406 0.24 -4.3 1 .33
E 58892 0.44 -2.2 35 .33
E∗ L 73047 0.31 -4.6 3 1 .49
E∗ A 74202 0.3 -4.4 -1.1 1 .31
E L 51146 0.52 -2.4 4 60 .63
E A 51665 0.52 -2.4 -1.3 51 .56
Model fit results and discussion
These results show that the large majority of participants are
best described by variants of the structural change model
of causal judgment that simply balances judgment inertia
against a desire to accommodate the latest evidence. Partic-
ipants were split fairly evenly between being better captured
by the true likelihoods L compared to the simple explanatory
inadequacy A proxy. Furthermore, estimated S∗ and B∗ val-
ues were less variable over conditions than the true values
and stronger and sparser on average (Figure 3c), in line with
the idea that participants relied on simplifying assumptions
over trained likelihoods. No participant was best described
by soft-maximising over the Bayesian posterior. Participants
with average accuracy levels at chance were predominantly
best captured by the E only model, indicating that their judg-
ments were sequentially dependent but did not meaningfully
reflect the data. The better fit for models using edit distance
E rather than E∗ suggests that participants do not just stick
with the same model, but rather tend to make local, rather
than drastic, changes.
Experiment 2
The fact that many participants are well captured by the
model that relies on heuristic likelihoods suggests that peo-
ple will still be able to learn causal models well even if they
do not know S and B parameters explicitly. We therefore
designed a second experiment (demo at ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-
lab/el/ns15b) to test this effect. Furthermore, by asking sub-
jects to re-register every link after every new test, we fixed
a potential shortcoming of Experiment 1, in which the iner-
tia in judgments might have arisen from subjects’ response
laziness (i.e., not being bothered to change links) rather than
inferential heuristics.
Participants 111 UCL undergraduates (mean±SD age
18.7± 0.9, 22 male) took part in Experiment 2 as part of a
course. They were incentivized as previously, but this time
with the opportunity to win Amazon vouchers rather than
money directly. They were split randomly into 8 conditions
mean size 13.8±3.4.
Design and procedure Experiment 2 used the same task in-
terface as Experiment 1, but focused just on the three variable
problems. There were two background noise conditions B ∈
[.1, .25] and two causal strength conditions S∈ [.9, .75]. How-
ever, unlike in Experiment 1, participants were not trained on
these parameters, but only told that: “the connections do not
always work”, and “sometimes components can activate by
chance”.
To assess the influence of laziness, we examined two re-
porting conditions between subjects: remain and disappear.
In the remain condition, judgments stayed on the screen into
the next test, so participants did not have to change anything if
they wanted to register the same judgement at t as at t−1. In
the disappear condition, the previous judgment disappeared
as soon as participants entered a new test. They then had
explicitly to select what they wanted for every connection
after each test.2 At the end of the task, people were asked
to estimate, in 100 tries how often: “components turn on by
themselves?” (B) and “how often do the causal connections
2We also elicited additional judgments about expected outcomes
of interventions, confidence in individual connections and ’helpful-
ness’ of each outcome; however we do not report on these here for
space reasons.
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work?”(S).
Results and modeling
Performance in Experiment 2 was comparable to the 3-
variable problems in Experiment 1. For example, mean±SD
accuracy in Experiment 2, [B= 0.1,S= 0.75] was .63±0.27
and [B = 0.25,S = 0.75] was .58± 0.31 while Experiment 1
condition 5 [B= 0.15,S= 0.85]was .60±0.33. This suggests
that people can make reasonable structure judgments with-
out knowledge of exact parameters. Supporting these con-
clusions – participants’ final judgments of S and B suffered
bias and variance: for B = {.1; .25} the mean±SD estimates
were {.37± .24; .48± .20} respectively; for S = {.9, .75},
mean±SD estimates were {.75± .21; .64± .23}.
As with Experiment 1, participants were affected by higher
levels of background noise B t(108) = 2.7, p= 0.008, but not
the reliability of the links themselves S t(106) = 0.88, p =
0.37, and there was no difference in performance between
the two judgment elicitation conditions t(108) = 0.67, p =
0.50. Analysis of variance revealed an effect of condition
on final judgment accuracy F(7,103) = 2.87,η2 = 0.16, p=
0.008 with a significant interaction between S and judgment
type, with a .21 additional drop in accuracy going from S=0.9
to S=0.75 in the disappear condition compared to the remain
condition.
To check if the structure change model in Experiment 1
was driven by lazy reporting, we fit the models as before3.
We found that once again the large majority of participants
were fit by variants of the structural change model, both when
judgments remain (47/53) and when they disappear (48/58),
this time with a larger proportion better fit by EL than EA
(32/47 for remain and 32/48 for disappear conditions), sug-
gesting some sensitivity to the noisy-or aspect of the likeli-
hoods at least for three variable problems. 5/53 and 10/53 in
the remain and disappear conditions respectively were best fit
by the model based on the Bayesian posterior P(D|M).
General Discussion
In sum, people were able to learn complex causal models,
but exhibited strong sequential dependence and variability
in their judgments. These patterns were well-captured by a
heuristic model, inspired by “Neurath’s ship”, that maintains
a single model, and attempts to account for incoming evi-
dence by making local changes. However, we have not yet
provided a plausible process model for the local search.
The model is still too simple in at least three respects. First,
it assumes no memory of past evidence beyond the insuffi-
cient statistic of the current causal model. It is likely that
subjects can remember some past experience, and combine
it with the current datum when updating their beliefs. Of
course, outside the lab setting, it is unlikely that our expe-
rience relevant to single causal models is adequately contigu-
ous for this to be very useful in practice.
3For P(D|M)we used importance sampling with 20,000 particles
to marginalize over S and B, updating a density for each over the
course of the 36 trials in the task.
Second, while participants’ judgments showed high se-
quential dependence, they did occasionally change their
model abruptly. The theory of unexpected uncertainty (Yu
& Dayan, 2003), and substantial work on changepoint tasks
(Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010) are associated with the no-
tion that people will sometimes “start over” if they are hav-
ing consistently poor predictions from their existing model
(Lakatos, 1976). Experiments in which the underlying struc-
ture changes over time would provide pointers.
Finally, we did not examine the selection of interventions,
but only how to learn from them. Participants’ interventions
were far from perfectly efficient – in 100 simulations of the
task, an active learning algorithm that selects interventions
greedily to minimize its expected uncertainty over the space
of possible structures, and updates beliefs optimally, achieves
considerably higher final accuracy (mean 0.81, see white cir-
cles in Figure 3) compared with what could be achieved given
the data participants actually saw (mean 0.69). This also
raises further important questions.
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